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Ⅰ．Introduction
　Seniority wages and long-term employment are 
widely recognised as central elements of the typical 
Japanese management system, which is sometimes 
presented in exaggerated form as being based on life-
time employment, together with enterprise unionism 
（see, for example, Hart and Kawasaki, 1999）. Typical-
ly, wages increase with age in Japan, but a pure se-
niority wage system is very exceptional. Normally, 
wages are determined by both merit and seniority. It 
is, therefore, more accurate to say that Japanese em-
ployees have upward sloping age-wage profiles, rath-
er than a seniority wage system. The wage system 
has been modified in the past, but upward sloping 
age-wage profiles have been maintained up to the 
present for standard employees. Broad and striking 
changes, however, appeared in Japanese pay systems 
in the early 1990s, after the bubble economy burst, 
and the influence of merit in pay and promotion is be-
coming more important in Japanese firms （Benson 
and Debroux, 1998；Jacoby, 1995；Morishima, 1995）.
　It is often stated that the seniority wage system and 
long-term employment are positively related to sys-
tematic skill formation through on-the-job training 
and the strength of Japanese firms （e.g. Kumazawa, 
1997；Shimada, 1994）. In addition, it is also argued 
that the combination of upward sloping age-wage pro-
files and long-term employment provide incentives to 
workers （e.g. Becker, 1962；Lazear, 1979）. Clearly, 
any pay reform that substantially modifies long-term 
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ABSTRACT
　This paper has outlined the background and characteristics of the 1990s pay reforms. Pay reform resulted from the 
need to decrease labour costs. This necessity was caused by economic depression, demographic conditions and 
intensified world competition. The main characteristic of pay reform was to decrease seniority/age factors and 
increase merit factors. However, these changes varied by job track and status. The target of the pay reform was 
focused on managers both because they were not protected by unions and because managersʼ supply greatly 
exceeded demand for demographic and economic reasons. Therefore, the pay reform in the 1990s was cosmetic, and 
not resulted in decisive changes of Japanese pay systems.
要　旨
　本論文は1990年代の賃金制度改革の背景と特徴を論述するものである。賃金制度改革は人件費削減の必要性の結果
である。これは経済不況、人口構造の状況、国際競争の高まりから生じた。賃金制度改革の主な特徴は年功的要素を
減らし、成果的要素を増加させることであった。しかし、これらの変化はジョブ・トラックと職位により異なってい
た。賃金制度改革は、組合による保護がなく、人口構成上の理由と経済的理由から供給過多になっていた管理職がタ
ーゲットになっていた。したがって限定的な面があり、1990年代の賃金制度改革は日本的賃金制度全体からみると決
定的な変化には至らなかった。
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Tanaka, et. al. 2001）. I will discuss below the details 
of the economic depression, demographic conditions 
and the unionsʼ attitudes towards pay reform.
１．Economic Depression
　Japan experienced an economic boom from the mid 
1980s until the economic bubble finally burst in 1992. 
Since then, Japan has suffered severe economic de-
pression. According to the Economic Planning Agen-
cy, Japan （1999）, real GDP declined by minus 0.4％ in 
1997 for the first time since the 1974 oil shock. Subse-
quently, real GDP recovered slightly, but it fell again 
in 2001 （Cabinet Office, 2002）.
　The recession is rooted in the failure of macroeco-
nomic policy after the sharp appreciation of the Japa-
nese currency （the yen） in the mid 1980s. In Septem-
ber 1985, the G5 countries （Britain, France, Germany, 
Japan and the US） intervened in the exchange mar-
kets in order to depreciate the US dollar （Plaza Ac-
cord）. This aimed to help decrease the massive trade 
deficit of the US. Due to the sudden and dramatic ap-
preciation of the Japanese yen, Japanese manufactur-
ers had difficulty exporting goods. In addition, in re-
sponse to international pressure against Japanʼs trade 
surplus, the government needed to increase domestic 
demand. Therefore, low interest rates were set by the 
Bank of Japan in order to moderate the effect of the 
sudden appreciation of the yen on manufacturers and 
to stimulate domestic demand. Although there was an 
option to increase government spending to expand do-
mestic demand, the Japanese government, which was 
seeking to reduce government debt, relied heavily on 
its monetary rather than its fiscal policy （Shimada, 
1994）. As a result, extremely low interest rates con-
tinued from the mid 1980s. The bubble economy was 
created not only by expansionary monetary policy 
（low interest rates）, but also by the newly launched fi-
nancial liberalisation which resulted partly from for-
eign pressure for open markets （Blomstrom et. al., 
2001）. Excess money flow pushed up the prices of 
stock and land. At the same time, firms were shifting 
from direct to indirect finance, due to financial liberali-
sation. Therefore, banks lost stable borrowers and 
over-lent to risky customers. The money which was 
lent at low cost was used for speculation on stock and 
land, and the economic bubble increased dramatically 
in size. In 1992, the bubble finally burst, associated 
with a slow down in the world economy.
　Subsequently, world competition was intensified 
further due to the development of the ex-communist 
countries. In 1997, the Asian economic crisis and the 
increase in consumer tax damaged the economic re-
covery. As noted above, this prolonged economic de-
employment, incentive systems and related internal 
firm practices could have critical importance for the 
wider Japanese system of labour management. Abeg-
glen （1958） argued that “the Japanese system is on 
the whole self-consistent” （Abegglen, 1958, p130）. 
This paper looks at the impact of pay reform for stan-
dard employees in the 1990s and shows that it is diffi-
cult to discern any fundamental changes to date （see 
also Lincoln and Nakata, 1997）.
Ⅱ． Background to the Pay Reform of the 
1990s
　The main aim of the 1990s pay reform was to de-
crease seniority/age elements （or increase merit fac-
tors）, resulting in widening wage dispersion. In par-
ticular, performance-based pay （seikashugi chin-
gin） is a key concept of the 1990s pay reform. After 
the bubble economy burst, the Japan Federation of 
Employersʼ Associations （or Nikkeiren）, the leading 
business association, published a significant book re-
garding their pay policy, “Japanese Management in 
the New Era” （Shinjidan no nihonteki keiei） 
（1995）. This book argued that Japanese pay principles 
should be more performance-based （seikashugi） in 
future. In addition, it stated that long-term employ-
ment was unnecessary for all standard employees, 
and that the seniority promotion system should also 
be modified. The Japan Federation of Employersʼ As-
sociations explained that pay reform aimed to de-
crease total labour costs. The policy reflects the fact 
that traditional pay systems, which make seniority/
age factors significant in pay and promotion systems, 
have become a burden to Japanese firms in a situation 
of economic depression, intensified world competition, 
and an ageing workforce.
　According to Shimazu （2002）, the cost of labour 
（employeesʼ income as a share of national income） in 
Japan was lower than that in the US from 1980 to 
1993, but exceeded it between 1994 and 2000. Japa-
nese national income decreased due to the economic 
recession, but labour costs increased because seniori-
ty wages automatically increased as the workforce 
aged. Clearly, relatively high labour costs work nega-
tively against Japanese firms in world competition. It 
is, therefore, natural that Japanese firms recognise 
the necessity to decrease labour costs in order to 
maintain their competitiveness. It was also widely 
predicted that the traditional pay system, with its sub-
stantial proportion of seniority or age factors, would 
further increase labour costs with the inevitable fur-
ther ageing of the workforce （for example, Genda, 
1999；Koshiro, 2000；Kusuda 1999；Shimazu, 2002；
28
1990 年代の日本的賃金制度改革の影響
When the economic depression started in 1992, they 
were already 45-47 years old and receiving high sala-
ries. In addition, it is expected that firms will have to 
pay out large cash lump-sums when the baby boom-
ers retire in the near future. Therefore, it is conceiv-
able that the existence of the baby boomers strength-
ened the necessity for pay reform.
　Moreover, Genda （1999） argued that the problem 
with baby boomers is not only their huge number, but 
also their high level of education. In 1965, when the 
baby boomers were at student age, 294,540 enrolled in 
higher education institutions （universities, colleges 
and polytechnics） （Ministry of Education, 2000）. This 
had more than doubled from 131,526 in 1955. The 
numbers enrolling in higher education have continu-
ously increased ever since, but there has never been 
another period of such rapid change. Furthermore, 
when the baby boomers finished their higher educa-
tion, the Japanese economy was growing rapidly. It 
was, thus, relatively easy for them to obtain jobs in 
the managerial track in large enterprises. The Japa-
nese labour market subsequently shrunk due to the 
1973 Oil Shock, and Genda （1999） argued that many 
baby boomers remained with the firms to which they 
were first recruited. He argued that most baby boom-
ers became managers in the 1980s due to seniority 
promotion systems, resulting in an excess supply of 
managers. This issue will be discussed later in associ-
ation with changes in age-wage profiles.
３．Unions’ Attitudes
　In the private sector, wage bargaining is conducted 
at individual enterprises, except for a few occupa-
tions. Normally, each firm has its own enterprise 
union, to which all non-managers belong regardless of 
their job tracks. The unions have been co-operative 
with management, especially in the last three decades 
due to the Oil Shock and the subsequent appreciation 
pression was the worst since the Oil Shock, and also 
lasted longer. Clearly, it damaged firmsʼ profits signifi-
cantly. In this situation, firms are prone to cutting any 
stable costs, including labour costs.
２．Demographic Conditions
　Firms also needed to conduct pay reform for demo-
graphic reasons. The birth rate peaked during 1947-
1949, immediately after the Second World War （Min-
istry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2002）. Those 
who were born during this period were termed the 
“baby boomers”. The second peak occurred during 
1971-74, and these are termed the “children of the 
baby boomers”. These are significantly fewer in num-
ber than the original baby boomers. Subsequently, the 
birth rate significantly and continuously decreased un-
til the present day. By contrast, life expectancy in-
creased due to improvements in health care and hy-
giene. Accordingly, on average, the Japanese pop u-
la tion has been dramatically ageing, and the elderly 
proportion （65 years old or over） increased consider-
ably from 4.9％ in 1950 to 17.5％ in 2002 （Ministry of 
Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Tele-
communications, 2002）.
　The Japanese population structure significantly 
changed between 1950 and 1999, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. The young substantially outnumbered the old in 
1950, and thus the seniority wage system did not cre-
ate problems for firms. The situation, however, com-
pletely changed over the next 50 years. The 1999 fig-
ure shows the two peaks of the baby boomers and 
their children, while the population after the children 
of the baby boomers decreases sharply.
　The Japanese population is not only continuously 
ageing, but also has a peculiar structure, with the two 
peaks of the baby boomers and their children. It is 
noteworthy that the baby boomers received under the 
traditional seniority wage system in the late 1990s. 
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Figure 1　Japanese Population by Age in 1950 and 1999
Source：National Institute of Population and Social Security Research （2002）
Note：In the 1950 data, Okinawa Prefecture is not included.
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nature of enterprise unions, their survival is aligned 
with the firmsʼ survival in the market. Hence, espe-
cially in large firms, enterprise unions remember that 
their membersʼ working conditions are significantly 
better than in small and medium sized firms, and thus 
their first priority has been the protection of employ-
ment （Koshiro, 1998）. Wage bargaining is not radical 
in Japan, because there is a mutual understanding be-
tween the two sides and, in most cases, management 
provides the union with confidential information about 
the profitability of the firm, and productivity per em-
ployee, before the annual wage negotiation （Morishi-
ma, 1992）.
　Thus, the major reason for pay reform was econom-
ic depression, and intensified world competition made 
the situation even more serious. In addition, there 
were two notable domestic factors encouraging the 
pay reform. Firstly, economic recession happened at a 
bad moment with an ageing workforce and aged baby 
boomers worsening the burden of labour costs. Sec-
ondly, unions were generally open to co-operation 
with management on pay reform issues. How did pay 
reform develop in these conditions?
Ⅲ．The 1990s Pay Reform
　The influence of merit in pay and promotion is be-
coming more important in Japanese firms （see for ex-
ample, Benson and Debroux, 1998；Hart and Kawasa-
ki, 1999；Jacoby, 1995；Morishima, 1995；Shibata, H. 
2000）.
　In 1999, the Ministry of Labour, Japan, undertook a 
survey regarding changes in wage systems in 5,297 
firms with 30 standard employees or more, and 93％ 
of firms responded （Nihon keizai shinbun, 2000）. Ac-
cording to the survey, 53％ of firms had altered their 
wage systems in the last 3 years, and 39.7％ intended 
to modify their wage systems in the next 3 years. 15.8
％ of firms had increased the proportion of pay in a 
salary which is determined by job grade. 15.5％ of 
firms increased the proportion of pay which varies ac-
cording to the performance of the firm or individuals 
within it. This was particularly clear in large firms 
with 1,000 employees or more, and 38.8％ of large 
firms had increased the proportion of pay which var-
ies according to the performance of the firm and/or 
the individual. In pay reform, there is a clear trend 
that seniority has decreased in importance while mer-
it has increased.
　In addition, some innovative firms have implement-
ed a radical Annual Salary System （nenpo-sei） （Ari-
ga et. al., 2000）. For a long period, Japanese employ-
ees were unfamiliar with the concept of an annual 
of the yen （e.g. Koshiro, 1998 and Weathers, 1999）. 
As a result of stable union-employer relations, unions 
were not militant, and the rate of wage increase was 
determined with careful consideration of the firmsʼ 
competitiveness in the world market；therefore, the 
rate of wage increases from 1973 to 1998 has been cor-
related to the consumer price index, labour demand, 
exchange rate against the US dollar （the currency of 
the major trade partner）, and the indexes of export 
and import prices （Koshiro, 1998）.
　The enterprise unions affiliate to upper-level 
unions, such as industrial federation and national con-
federations. Among the three national confederations, 
the Japanese Trade Union Confederation （or Rengo） 
is the leading union confederation. Most major firms, 
and 64％ of unionised workers in Japan, are affiliated 
to it （Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2001）. 
It is the third largest organisation in the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, after the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor and Congress of International 
Organizations in the USA, and the Deutscher Gewerk-
schaftsbund in Germany （Japanese Trade Union Con-
federation, 2002）. The Japan Trade Union Con fed-
er a tion and the Japan Federation of Employersʼ As so-
ciations are key actors in annual wage bargaining in 
Japan.
　In 1996, the Japanese Trade Union Confederation 
conducted a survey of over 1,405 unions, including 645 
unions of large firms, to which 889 unions, including 
456 unions of large firms, responded （Japanese Trade 
Union Confederation, 1997）. The opinion poll investi-
gated the increasing importance of job-related wages 
（or decreasing proportion of person-related wages 
with seniority or age factors）. 46.6％ of unions re-
sponded that they accepted it, or would accept it with 
certain conditions. 5.1％ said that they were willing to 
accept the change unconditionally. 30.6％ had not de-
cided their attitudes towards this change. Only 9.6％ 
of unions answered “we cannot accept it because a 
negative effect is predicted” （8.2％ of responses were 
not applicable.）. Similarly, many unions accepted in-
creasing or implementing contingent pay which varies 
according to the performance of individuals in the 
short term. 4.8％ of unions were willing to accept this, 
and 31.2％ accepted or would accept it with certain 
conditions. Yet, 11.7％ of unions stated “we cannot ac-
cept it because a negative effect is predicted”. 43.5％ 
had not decided their attitudes towards this change, 
and this indicated that the increase in the contingent 
part in wages was a relatively new issue in pay chang-
es.
　Therefore, most unions were not opposed to the 
1990s pay reform. This is understandable. Due to the 
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1980 and 1994 （Table 1）. This result indicates that 
long-term employment gradually intensified over the 
last four decades, as follows.
　The proportion of employees who worked for a sin-
gle firm after school/university graduation was origi-
nally high in firms with 5,000 employees or more and 
greatly increased between 1980 and 1994. Those aged 
55-59 more than doubled from 29％ to 65％ during the 
same period in firms with 5,000 employees or more. In 
1980, no more than 50％ in any age group among high 
school leavers worked for a single firm. It appears 
that long-term employment came to be common first 
among white-collar university graduates in the mana-
gerial track, and that it took time for the custom to 
spread widely to other workers. It is supposed that 
long-term employment became common also for high 
school leavers during the 1960s and 1970s. Since the 
55-59 years age group in 1980 left high school in the 
1940s, they were excluded from the long-term em-
ployment custom. Therefore, the younger the employ-
ees, the higher the proportions of those who worked 
for a single firm after their high school graduation, ac-
cording to the data of 1994. This gradation shows the 
way that long-term employment steadily increased in 
popularity over the last 40 years. By 1994, long-term 
employment had become a common custom for all 
standard male workers regardless of job track.
　Although the study of Chuma （1997） covers the pe-
riod up to 1994, length of tenure continued to increase 
after this （Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Ja-
pan, 2002）. Thus, long-term employment, which is 
one of the ʻthree pillarsʼ of the Japanese wage system, 
has not decreased in the 1990s. On the contrary, it has 
rather intensified. Firms seem to prefer to modify 
age-wage profiles, rather than long-term employ-
ment, under the constraint of tightened labour costs. 
This stems from two factors. Firstly, long-term em-
ployment and seniority wages are positively related to 
systematic skills formation through on-the-job train-
ing and the strength of Japanese firms （e.g. Kumaza-
wa, 1997 and Shimada, 1994）. Upward sloping age-
salary, since their salary basis was monthly in gener-
al. Nenpo （annual salary） was only known as the pay 
system for professional baseball players. Therefore, 
the implementation of an Annual Salary System ap-
pears to the Japanese to be extremely merit-oriented. 
Ariga et. al. （2000） defined the Annual Salary System 
（nenpo-sei） as follows：（1） oneʼs annual pay is deter-
mined solely by job assignment and performance；（2） 
pay varies greatly according to the result of personal 
assessment by supervisors；（3） age-related pay is 
abandoned. They argued that the Annual Salary Sys-
tem can require fundamental changes in pay and per-
sonal appraisals, and eliminates the overlapping of pay 
ranges between job grades.
　As a result of these changes, it has been observed 
that tenure has risen, while age-wage profiles have 
flattened. For a long time, long-term employment and 
upward sloping age-wage profiles were regarded as 
an inseparable combination. This phenomenon, how-
ever, indicates that the protection of employment has 
a higher priority than ʻseniority wageʼ in Japanese 
firms. We will map out below the changes in tenure 
and age-wage profiles.
　Length of tenure in Japanese firms has risen steadi-
ly among all job tracks in all sizes of firms, despite the 
economic depression （Chuma, 1997）. From 1992 to 
1999, the average tenure of all employees increased 
from 10.9 years to 11.8 years （Ministry of Health, La-
bour and Welfare, Japan, 2013）. Chuma （1997） stud-
ied the changes from 1980 to 1994 in so-called ʻperma-
nent employmentʼ, namely, the proportion of those 
who worked for a single firm after school/university 
graduation. For example, since most people leave high 
school at age 18, high school leavers with 32 years ten-
ure or more at age 50-54 were expected to have 
worked for the same firm since their high school grad-
uation. University graduates were assumed to enter 
the job market at 22 or 23 years old, because it is com-
mon to re-try entrance examinations at the age of 19 
and to graduate at the age of 23. The estimations dem-
onstrated that the tenure of both groups rose between 
Male Standard University Graduates
Tenure ＜17 years 17-21 22-26 27-31
Age group Age
40-44
Age
45-49
Age
50-54
Age
55-59
≥5,000 
employees
1980 82％ 66％ 66％ 29％
1994 78％ 77％ 75％ 65％
1,000-4,999 
employees
1980 73％ 63％ 50％ 13％
1994 71％ 72％ 63％ 54％
Source：Chuma （1997）
Table 1　 Proportion of Employees Who Work for a Single Firm After Graduation from School/University 
（Large Firms）
Male Standard High School Leavers
Tenure ＜17 years 17-21 22-26 27-31
Age group Age
40-44
Age
45-49
Age
50-54
Age
55-59
≥5,000 
employees
1980 46％ 50％ 48％ 21％
1994 77％ 65％ 61％ 36％
1,000-4,999 
employees
1980 44％ 39％ 28％ 10％
1994 64％ 52％ 52％ 29％
Source：Chuma （1997）
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sharp contrast is observed by job track. Wage disper-
sion of male standard white-collar university gradu-
ates increased only in their late 30s or above；but 
there were no significant changes among standard 
male white-collar high school leavers；and it is note-
worthy that wage dispersion decreased among stan-
dard male blue-collar workers in their late 30s or 
above from 1980 to 1999. The implementation of an 
Annual Salary System shows a sharp contrast be-
tween managers and non-managers. According to a 
survey by Roumu Gyousei Kenkyusho （1998） from 
April 1996 to June 1997 involving 150 major firms in 
various industries, 20.7％ of firms introduced an An-
nual Salary System for managers, but only 3.3％ of 
firms implemented the system for all employees.
　It is likely that this tendency will continue. Table 2 
presents the results of an opinion survey conducted 
by a research institute, Shakai keizai seisansei honbu 
（1998）, concerning future pay policy. The weight of 
merit is more significant for managers, and the impor-
tance of seniority is more significant for non-manag-
ers. For example, 38.3％ of firms considered that pay 
should be determined solely by job-ability and result-
related pay for managers, but the proportion was only 
2.4％ for non-managers. In contrast, 14.9％ of firms 
responded that their future pay policy will be mainly 
seniority pay for non-managers, but this was only 2.9
％ for managers. Different attitudes toward pay policy 
by job status are consistent with the changes in wage 
dispersion by job track from 1980 to 1990 in which 
only managersʼ wage dispersion increased. In Table 2, 
“solely job-ability & result-related pay” is treated as 
the Annual Salary System （nenpo-sei） using the defi-
nition provided by Ariga et. al. （2000）. Therefore, an 
Annual Salary System is, and will be, much more com-
mon for managers, than for non-managers.
　Why are managers the major target of pay reform? 
There are two main reasons：（1） protection by unions 
（Ministry of Labour, Japan, 2000） and （2） the excess 
supply of managers （Imada and Hirata, 1995；Genda, 
wage profiles can be temporarily weakened and 
recovered in future, but employment cannot. It is, 
thus, understandable that Japanese firms attempt to 
protect employment, especially that of core workers 
（standard male employees）. This is also reflected in 
recent unemployment statistics. Due to the severe 
economic condition, the unemployment rate consider-
ably increased from 2.2％ in 1992 to 4.7％ in 1999 
（Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 
2013）. It is, however, argued that unemployment was 
a phenomenon occurring mainly among older men 
（55-64 year olds） and younger women （25-34 year 
olds） （Rebick, 2001）. Rebick claimed that unemploy-
ment of prime-age men was below 2％ and that fami-
ly well-being was not seriously damaged, even though 
the overall unemployment rate was significantly high-
er （4.9％ in June 1999）.
　Secondly, a legal reason should be highlighted. 
Whilst labour law provides the right of dismissal to 
employers, it is unlikely that they will win court cases 
without substantial reasons （Koshiro, 1997）. There-
fore, when Japanese firms, especially large ones, face 
economic depression, they tend to avoid large scale 
layoffs, and attempt to protect the employment of 
their core workers, who are normally standard male 
employees, by restricting overtime, laying off part-
timers, changing individualsʼ jobs, secondments to 
subsidiary firms, decreasing/stopping mid-career re-
cruitment, temporary suspensions, early retirement 
plans and having fewer new intakes （Koshiro, 1998）.
　It is noteworthy that the modification of the pay 
system varies according to job track and status. Be-
cause there is a correlation between job status and 
age, it also depends on age. Changes in wage disper-
sion can be a proxy for the implementation of perfor-
mance-related pay. According to the Ministry of La-
bour, Japan （2000）, wage dispersion rose from 1980 to 
1999 only among standard male university graduates 
in their late 30s or over. In contrast, it decreased 
among those in their 20s. In manufacturing firms, a 
Table 2　Pay Policy in the Future
Managers（％）Non-managers（％）
Solely seniority pay 2.9 14.9
Seniority ＝ job-ability & result/related pay 2.4 16.0
Seniority ＜ job-ability & result-related pay（1） 15.7 38.6
Seniority ＜＜ job-ability & result-related pay（2） 39.4 26.6
Solely job-ability & result-related pay 38.3 2.4
Total 100.0 100.0
Source：Shakai keizai seisansei honbu（1998）
Note：（1）Seniority remains, but job-ability & result-related pay is more important.
（2） Seniority is minimised, and job-ability & result-related pay is the main element 
in pay determination.
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to 1999 by 5％ , but this was not enough. As a result, it 
took longer to become lower, middle and upper man-
agers, and also university graduates who did not be-
come managers appeared. It has also been argued 
that the older the average age of employees in a firm, 
the later their age on becoming a manager （Ministry 
of Labour, Japan, 2000）. Consequently, the degree of 
excess supply of those in their 40s and 50s was partic-
ularly serious among university graduates （white-col-
lar workers on the managerial track）.
Ⅳ．Conclusion
　This paper has outlined the background and charac-
teristics of the 1990s pay reforms. Pay reform result-
ed from the need to decrease labour costs. This neces-
sity was caused by economic depression, demographic 
conditions and intensified world competition. Pay re-
form is a general trend and is particularly significant 
in large firms. Unions usually show co-operative atti-
tudes towards pay reform.
　The main characteristic of pay reform is to de-
crease seniority/age factors and increase merit fac-
tors. The key concept of the 1990s pay reform is the 
implementation of performance-based pay （seika-
shugi chingin）, of which the Annual Salary System 
（nenpo-sei） is one major type. As a result, it is as-
sumed that wage dispersion among employees will be 
widened by individualsʼ merit payments.
　Despite pay reform, tenure increased between 1992 
and 1999 （Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Ja-
pan, 2002）. Chuma （1997） examined the proportion of 
those who work for a single firm after school/universi-
ty graduation, and claimed that long-term employ-
ment has gradually intensified over the last 40 years. 
One of the reasons might be a positive link with skills 
development, yet it should also be noted that standard 
employees are legally protected.
　This paper considers at the typical Japanese system 
of wages and promotion, and seeks to examine the im-
pact of pay reform on large Japanese firms in the 
1990s and its implication on the people involved. It has 
been argued that upward sloping age-wage profiles 
and long-term employment are positively related to 
the strength of Japanese firms （e.g. Becker, 1962；Ku-
mazawa, 1997；Lazear, 1979；Shimada, 1994）.
　However, upward sloping age-wage profiles have 
been gradually flattening out. But, these changes vary 
by job track and status. The target of the pay reform 
was focused on managers both because they are not 
protected by unions and because managersʼ supply 
greatly exceeds demand for demographic and eco-
nomic reasons.
1999；Okunishi, 1998）.
　Firstly, managers are the easiest target for altering 
wages, since they do not belong to unions. As de-
scribed above, managers cannot belong to enterprise 
unions. There are some independent unions for man-
agers, but it is a very exceptional case to affiliate to 
them. Secondly, an excess supply of managers has 
been caused by an excess supply of university gradu-
ates, the great number of baby boomers and the insuf-
ficient increases in managerial posts due to slow eco-
nomic growth. According to a study by Imada and 
Hirata （1995） regarding a large Japanese manufactur-
ing firm with approximately 35,000 employees, the 
number of university graduates exceeded that of high 
school leavers in the firm after 1976. The number of 
university graduates has dramatically increased in Ja-
pan. The proportion of full-time high school students 
who went to university was 11％ in 1965, and this sub-
sequently steadily increased to 31％ in 1975 and 38％ 
in 1995 （Ministry of Education, Japan, 2000）. Thus, it 
is a common phenomenon in Japan that the relative 
importance of university graduates fell gradually but 
continuously. A firm I investigated decreased the rela-
tive status of university graduates. The firm changed 
its pay system because they estimated that qualified 
high school leavers would be in short supply. Several 
university graduates have already worked as blue-
collar workers in the firm.
　Moreover, Okunishi （1998） argued that flattening 
age-wage profiles are closely related to the propor-
tion of workers in their 40s and 50s, because the rapid-
ly ageing Japanese population has resulted in an ex-
cess labour supply of 40 and 50 year olds, leading to 
downward pressure on their wages. The existence of 
baby boomers worsened the situation. The Ministry of 
Labour, Japan （2000） claimed that the more the work-
force of a firm is ageing, the flatter the age-wage pro-
files of their employees are. This supports Okunishiʼs 
argument.
　Furthermore, it is a problem when the number of 
posts does not increase sufficiently. Normally, promo-
tion management is based on peer-cohort and job 
track. In general, all male university graduates are 
put onto the managerial track together, and are sup-
posed to become managers by their 30s. If firms grow, 
the number of posts increases, but this did not occur 
during the economic recession of the 1990s.
　Rebick （2001） argued that the number of manageri-
al posts for older employees became fixed during the 
1980s and 1990s, and that this resulted in reduced mo-
rale among employees. In contrast, the Ministry of La-
bour, Japan （2000） stated that firms in all industries 
increased the number of managerial posts from 1980 
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